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E-Commerce Oriented Human-Computer Negotiation Strategy Model
Mukun Cao1,Hong Hong1*
1
School of Management, XiamenUniversity, China
Abstract:Human-computer negotiation plays an important role in B2C e-commerce. There is a paucity of further scientific
investigation and a pressing need on designing the software agent that can deal with the human’s random and dynamic offer,
which is crucially useful in human-computer negotiation to achieve better online negotiation outcomes. The lack of such
studies has decelerated the process of applying automated negotiation to real world applications. To address the critical issue,
this paper develops a strategy concession model.The theoretical model and algorithm of the combined strategy were
developed. To demonstrate the effectiveness of this model, we implement a prototype and conduct human-computer
negotiations over 121 subjects. The experimental analysis not only confirms our model’s effect but also reveals some
insights into future work about human-computer negotiation systems.

Keywords: automated negotiation, negotiating agent, negotiation strategy

1.

INTRODUCTION
Negotiation is a communication process among a group of parties with conflicting interests or preferences

in order to reach an agreement or compromise [1, 2]. E-commerce oriented negotiation is increasingly assuming a
pivotal role in many organizations, and a number of prominent negotiation models have been developed over the
past decades[3].The human-computer negotiation plays a paramount role in the e-commerce oriented applications,
especially in the B2C context where software agents act as business provider [4]. Comparing with the traditional
online sales mode where customers view the basic product or service information on the website and often need
to negotiate with human salespeople through a “contact us” link, the human-computer automated negotiation
system can help business organizations to reduce the labor cost for negotiation and greatly increase the
transaction efficiency to the optimum extent.
Prior studies have been conducted to design the human-computer negotiation agent [5, 6], whichdemonstrate
that a softwareagent can proficiently negotiate with and even outperform people. Here we illustrate some typical
examples, such as the Diplomat agent[7], the AutONA agent[8], the Cliff-Edge Agent[9], the Colored-Trails agent
[10]

, the Guessing Heuristic agent

LaptopOnDemand.com

[14]

[11]

, the QOAgent[12], the Virtual Human agent

[13]

, and the

. Among all of these negotiating agents, only the LaptopOnDemand.com is an

e-commerce oriented application. Owing to the randomness of the human’s behavior, the e-commerce
human-computer negotiation context is assumedly more complicated. The human-computer negotiation system
accordingly needs much smarter software agents to negotiate with the human negotiators effectively. The agent
is expected to try different strategies to obtain a better negotiation outcome. The ability to quickly and
autonomously combine appropriate strategies among the candidates to cope with the negotiation situation is a
very important perspective for evaluating the designed agent’s intelligence level.
The main objective of this study is to construct and validate a generic and robust concession model in an
effort to support various strategies combination during the human-computer negotiation in e-commerce. From
our perspective, human-computer negotiation is essentially a behavioral game process

[15]

, in which single

strategy can hardly process all the possible complicated situation generated by the human’s random and dynamic
negotiation behavior. Our aim of this paper is designing a negotiation strategy that combines various strategies,
*
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which enable the agent to deal with as much complex negotiation context as possible to satisfy the practical
application environment of e-commerce.
2.

THE STRATEGY MODEL
This section presents our method for strategy integration. The simplest negotiation model is a bilateral

negotiation with a single attribute. In most cases, however, the negotiators have to process several attributes of
the product at the same time [1, 16]. Before making concession, the negotiator would trade off among the different
attributes. When they cannot trade off a satisfied result, they might concede according to the predefined
concession strategies, evolving to a similar process with the single attribute negotiation. As a result, we just
consider the price in our model.
2.1 The Time Dependent Negotiation Strategy
Our strategy selection model is based on Faratin’s time-dependent concession model, which indicates that
an agent is likely to concede more rapidly if it needs to reach an agreement by a deadline

[17]

. As depicted in

Figure 1, there is actually a family of concession curves, which can be defined simply by varying the value of
parameter

determining the convexity degree of the curve. The shape of the each concession curve represents

a human’s negotiation behavior. As there are infinite proposal curves (corresponding to infinite values of

, one

for each curve) included in the solution space, theoretically speaking, the model covers the entire possible
proposal curves the human being might choose during the process of the negotiation. The task of our
multi-strategy selection model is to select among all of these proposal curves dynamically to deal with the ever
changing opponent’s negotiation behavior, rather than fixing on one proposal curve from the beginning to the
end of the negotiation as the prior studies did.

Figure 1.The exponential functions for the computation of

. Time is presented as relative to

There are two different patterns of behavior: (1) the Boulware, discriminated by β

[17]

1, maintains the

offered value until the time is almost exhausted, whereupon they concede up to the reservation value; and (2) the
Conceder, discriminated by β
β

1, leads the agent to go quickly towards its reservation value. The curve with

1 represents the intermediate state between Boulware and Conceder.
The family of the proposal curves can be defined by function α t as follows:

α (t ) = exp
a
j

(1−

a
min( t ,tmax
)
a
tmax

) β ln K aj

(1)

where a is the agent’s name, j denotes the negotiation issue, t is a predominant time factor used to
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decide which value to offer in the next round, t
is the time by which agent a must have completed the
negotiation, and K is a constant that when multiplied by the size of the interval, determines the value of issue
j to be offered in the first proposal by agent a. So, we have α 0

K and α t

1.

2.2 The Selection Strategy
There has been a lot of work using the fixed time dependent strategy to negotiate (i.e., the agent keeps the
same strategy from the beginning to the end of the negotiation). We conducted fixed strategy
computer-computer negotiation experiment to test the success rate with the result just 31%, which cannot be
accepted in most real applications. However, in the real life negotiation, the negotiator often changes negotiation
strategy during the process of negotiation. Our expectation is enable the agent switch among the different time
dependent tactics, boulware or conceder, to form a strategy selection mechanism. To do so, the agent can cope
with the human’s ever-changing offers, rather than fixes at one negotiation strategy in the whole process of the
negotiation. So the agent needs to keep learning its counterpart’s negotiation behaviors and then adjusts its
current strategy to a proper one at a proper time to respond the opponent’s possible price changes.
The agent needs a criterion for strategy changing. Through a lots of negotiation experiences, we find that
there is close relationship between the human’s negotiation behavior and their concession mode. It is
commonsense that the negotiator suddenly increases or decreases concession drastically, comparing with the
former concession just made, often means that the negotiator is now changing its strategy. On the contrary, if the
negotiator keeps a steady concession (i.e., makes the same or similar concession at two neighboring offer and
keeps this style in a certain period), that often means the negotiator intends to keep current strategy unchanged
in the coming rounds. The increase and decrease of concession can be described by the concession rate, denoted
as θ, which is the ratio between the two neighboring concessions. The θ can be expressed formally from the
seller’s perspective as follows from the human buyer’s perspective:

(3)
where x

is the price offered by buyer b to seller s at time t, thus the difference between the agent’s

two neighboring offer prices,x

x

is a concession. So we have the following three cases:

(1) When the human buyer accelerates concession to approach its deadline (i.e., θ

1), in order to reach

an agreement surely, the agent seller has to adjust its strategy to cater to the buyer. With the opaque of both
negotiators’ strategies, the agent can only conjecture, imitate and adjust through the prices that the human just
offer. As to the imitation, we do not simply have the agent imitate the opponent’s concession, but imitate the
opponent’s concession rate. Namely, the seller agent imitates the human buyer’s concession rate θ, where the
agent can calculate its next offer through formula (), and deduce its new strategy function.
1
where x

(A.2)

denotes the seller agent’s offer to human buyer at time t.

(2) When the human buyer decelerates concession (i.e., θ

1), according to the time dependent tactic

model in section 3.2, this kind of situation takes place when the negotiator makes big concession at the
beginning of the negotiation. After that the agent gradually decreases concession to approach the reservation
price, and finally terminates at the deadline. In this circumstance, the seller agent will take 1⁄θ as its
concession rate, from which the seller agent calculates its next offer through formula (), and deduces the new
strategy function. The reason why the agent takes 1⁄θ instead of θ is because 1⁄θ

1, by which the agent

can develop more Conceder strategy to cater to the seller’s fast concession and reach an agreement quickly. This
can be proved by the following experiments.
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1

1

1

(A.2)

Based on the new offer obtained from the above formula () and (), a new strategy function can be deduced
as the following equation shows:
ｓ

,

1

where t is independent time variable and x

,

(A.9)

is the dependent offer price (seller to buyer) variable.

Through this function, the seller agent’s finds new strategy and negotiate along with it.
(3) When the human buyer keeps a steady concession rate (i.e., θ

1), making the same concessions

between the last two neighboring offers, the agent seller will simply keep the current strategy unchanged, and
will find a new point along the current strategy function curve to make the next offer.
The typical situations of the experiments are shown in Figure2, from which we can see there would not
have been an agreement point between the two initial strategy of the buyer and seller, but due to the seller’s
strategy selection ability, after several rounds of offer exchanges, the seller adjusted its strategy according to the
buyer’s concession change to finally find a deal point between them.

Figure 2. Computer-computer negotiation experiment comparison

3.

EXPERIMENT EVALUATION
This section will conduct lots of experiments to evaluate the effectiveness of our combined strategy

concession model, which will practically benefit real human-computer negotiation system development.
3.1 Experimental Design
To empirically validate the design hypotheses and the combined strategy concession model, we conducted
a between-subject experiment. 121 human subjects played the role of buyers negotiating purchases with same
amount of agent sellers, and were randomly assigned to negotiate with one of the three kinds of seller agent via
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a human-computer interaction interface, through which the human can input their offer, see the computer’s offer,
accept or reject the computer’s offer. The three kinds seller agent adopts different strategies: Boulware,
Conceder and Combined Strategy. Through comparing the different negotiation result, we can justify the
validity of the newly designed combined strategy concession model. Table 1 depicts the experiment design.
Table 1.The experiment design
Experiment Groups

Subject Number

Single Fixed Strategy

Combined Strategy

Boulware

Conceder

40

42

39

The negotiation topic is about a transaction on a rechargeable battery for mobile phones. The merchant’s
price for this 20000mha capacity portable battery is 107RMB. As there are many different similar type of brand
products in the online market with the price interval from 40RMB to 120RMB, the subjects are asked to achieve
the goal that trying their best to let the computer opponent to make concession as large as possible from the
original price 107RMB, and finally deals at a relative lower price to increase the buyer’s own utility as much as
possible. In order to facilitate the comparison study, all the negotiations are set under a same standard scenario.
(1) The human’s reservation price for this product is 80RMB, which means exceeding this price cannot be
accepted due to a negative utility. (2) For the seller agent side, the reservation price is set to 40RMB, under
which is non-acceptable. (3) In order to get a wide negotiation interval, the human buyer’s initial price is set to
￥20RMB. Therefore, subjects can make offer between 20 and 80 during the process of negotiation. What needs
further explanation is that the reason we set such a low initial price, which would not be understood in real-life
negotiation because it might irritate the opponent or be misunderstood as a noncooperation posture. In
human-computer negotiation, however, we consider the situation would be different with the human-human
dyads, as the computer is not easy to be irritated, on the contrary, setting a lower initial price will be benefit for
the negotiator to get a wider negotiation space.
3.2 Subjects
Before the main experiment, we conducted a pilot study involving 50 participants who were students and
teachers. The experimental procedure and questionnaire items were fine-tuned based on their feedback. Subjects
for the main experiment were recruited from classes (including MBA, postgraduate and undergraduate) in
September 2014. The subject recruitment was announced via multiple channels including the distribution of
flyers, the placement of posters and mass email. The announcement included a description about the nature of
the experiment and reward structure. The subject recruitment was also announced via researchers’ verbal
description about the experiment and direct invitation to the students after class.
In total, 121 subjects completed the experiment procedure and made 121 agent-human dyads for the
analysis of the main experiment. Table 1 summarizes the demographic information of the subjects. There are
more male subjects (63.6%) in terms of gender distribution and the majority of respondents are between 18 and
30 years of age (71.1%). With respect to education, about half of them hold master degree, 46.3% hold bachelor
degree and 3.3% hold doctoral degree. Furthermore, 61.2% of subjects are employees, and 38.8% are students.
As for employee subjects, most have worked for 5 to 10 years, and their industry is dispersive.
3.3 Hypotheses
The ensuing section elaborates on the hypotheses for the experiments.
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The human-computer dyad is more likely to reach an agreement (i.e., can achieve a
higher deal rate of the negotiation) when the agent makes combined strategy offers than when it makes single
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fixed strategy offers, i.e., Boulwar strategy (H1a) or Conceder strategy (H1b).
Hypothesis 2 (H2): An agent that uses the combined strategy is more likely to outperform the human than
the one that uses the single fixed strategy (i.e., boulware or conceder).
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The agent that makes combined strategy offers is more likely to reach an agreement
with human in shorter time than when it adopts single fixed boulware strategy, but longer than when it adopts
single fixed conceder strategy.
Hypothesis 4 (H4): A human counterpart is more likely to obtain a worse intrinsic utility after negotiating
with an agent that implement combined strategy than with one that implements single fixed strategy.
Hypothesis 5 (H5): An agent that implements combined strategy is more likely to obtain a better intrinsic
utility than the one that implements single fixed strategy after negotiating with a human counterpart.
Hypothesis 6 (H6): The human-computer dyad is more likely to obtain a better joint outcome (i.e., larger
utility product and smaller utility difference) when the agent implements the combined strategy than when it
implements the single fixed strategy.

4.

DATA ANALYSIS, RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This section experimentally compares the effects of combined strategy mechanism and the classical fixed

strategy mechanism in the human-computer negotiation.
96

-通用格式
-通用格式
-通用格式

bouware

-通用格式
-通用格式

conceder

-通用格式

42

-通用格式

38
31
26

-通用格式
-通用格式

16

-通用格式

selection

total
4

1

-通用格式
agreement number

agent win number

Figure 3. Experiment result for different strategy groups

According to the data in figure 3, overall, among the 121 agent-human dyads, 96 dyads obtained agreement
and 25 dyads ended up with no agreement. Among 96 agreed dyads, 32 dyads are agents accept humans’ offer,
and 64 are humans accept agents’ offers. By the “final offer” rule enforced in the experiment, non-agreement
cases only occurred when subjects reject the agent’s final offer, or a counteroffer fell into the agent’s rejection
region.
Success rate depends on the different strategy the agents employ. Among the 40 boulware agents, only 40%
made deals with the human. Towards the 42 conceder agents, almost all can reach agreements with human
(100%). The reason for so high success rate is due to the feature of the conceder strategy, which represents the
kind of negotiator who eagers to make a deal as soon as possible. Synthesizing the result of boulware and
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conceder, the agents that adopt single fixed strategy could make 70.7% deals, which is lower than the ratio when
the agent adopts our combined strategy (97.4%). As to the total effect for employing agent to negotiated with
human, nearly 79.3% negotiation succeeded, which implies the feasibility for using negotiating agent in
e-commerce negotiation.
All the hypotheses are supported, with the exception of H1b, but not affecting the overall judgment on H1,
as it is supported when we compare combined strategy to single fixed strategy, which is actually the
combination of the competitive and collaborative strategy. The logistic regression testing has been discussed
above. A summary of the outcomes of hypotheses testing is presented in Table 2.
Table 2. Hypotheses testing results
Hypotheses

Dependent

Relationships

Sig.

Results

Variable
H1

Partially Supported

Success rate

H1a

Selection>Bouware

0.000

Supported

H1b

Selection>Conceder

0.998

Not supported

H2

Agent win ratio

Fully Supported

H2a

Selection>Bouware

0.015

Supported

H2b

Selection>Conceder

0.000

Supported

H3

Final time

Fully Supported

H3a

Selection<Bouware

0.000

Supported

H3b

Selection>Conceder

0.042

Supported

H4

Buyer utility

Fully Supported

H4a

Selection<Bouware

0.034

Supported

H4b

Selection<Conceder

0.000

Supported

H5a

Selection>Bouware

0.034

Supported

H5b

Selection>Conceder

0.000

Supported

H5

H6

Seller utility

Fully Supported

Utility product

Fully Supported

H6a

Selection>Bouware

0.000

Supported

H6b

Selection>Conceder

0.000

Supported

H6c

Selection<Bouware

0.000

Supported

H6d

Selection<Conceder

0.000

Supported

Utility difference

5.

CONCLUSIONS
This research proposes a strategy model for automated negotiation system, and experimentally evaluates its

effects in the human-computer negotiation. The strategy model is a novel idea for the current automated
negotiation research, and should be considered as a requisite strategy to enable the agent dynamically respond
the human’s ever-changing offer and get agreement successfully. Experimental results confirmed that, compared
with the conventional single fixed strategy, the proposed multi-strategy selection mechanism leads to a higher
agreement ratio, better individual utility and joint utility. The contribution of this study leads to further valuable
empirical experiences for utilizing agent technology in a human-computer negotiation system, thus expected to
bridge the gap between the theoretical and practical aspects of the negotiation system.
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